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AMERICA'S WAR AIMS AND PEACE PROGRAM



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Prefatory Note

There have been dark moments when the faint hearted almost believed that the mailed fist and shining sword of the German war lord would win a peace "that corresponded to Germany's interest" and the world's undoing. Those days of doubt and distress are gone. Peace is near at hand, but it is not to be a "Hindenburg peace." It is to be a greater peace than we thought when we hoped for the peace of Wilson, of Lloyd George, and of Clemenceau. It will be a peace that conforms to the better thought of all those who have paid by sacrifice and suffering the price of the world's redemption from the imminent threat of military medievalism.

America has entered this war to see it through, through on the battle field and through in the peace conference. Her war aims are her peace purposes and her peace purposes are her war aims. "In the midst of peace prepare for war," was given a sinister meaning by Germany. "In the midst of war prepare for peace," has been given the meaning worth the careful thought of every citizen responsible now as never before for the execution of America's purpose. Upon an intelligent appreciation of the unchanging and just principles which have become the program of the world may rest the winning of a victory as great as that already won by Foch and Haig and Pershing. "A peace by understanding" means for America not a German peace, but a peace that looks to a new international order *understood and supported* by all who thoughtfully appreciate issues greater than territorial readjustments and balances of power.

The notes and addresses of President Wilson are well known, both in Europe and America, but the peace terms which have been formulated by European Governments are not so well known in this country; and at the present time, when hostilities have ceased and peace negotiations are about to begin, it is worth while to note the conditions which, from time to time,

have led to the discussion of peace, and to bring together for comparison the terms of both sides as they have been stated in each period. Such a comparison should lead to a clearer understanding of America's war aims and peace program, as well as the sharp contrast between the purposes of America and those of the enemies she was fighting.

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America's War Aims and Peace Terms

I

THE GERMAN PEACE MOVE OF 1916

The first official proposal for peace came from Germany, at the close of the year 1916, at a time when, in Germany's eyes, victory for her army was already at hand. In the west the Allies had no more than held the German line; while in the east the Central Powers had gained the aid of Turkey and Bulgaria, had overrun Poland, Serbia, Roumania, and had inflicted serious reverses upon the British in Mesopotamia. The Italians were advancing towards Trieste, and the sea was cleared of German merchant ships; but during the first two years then closing, the fortunes of war were decidedly with Germany and her allies. Under these circumstances the German Government offered to discuss peace, confident that if the Allies accepted the offer she could get what she wanted, while if they refused it, it could be made to appear that they were responsible for prolonging the conflict.

German Note of December 12, 1916.—The offer was contained in a note dated December 12, 1916, and forwarded to the belligerents through the neutral powers, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States. The essential paragraph of the note is the following:

Our aims are not to shatter nor annihilate our adversaries. In spite of our consciousness of our military and economic strength and our readiness to continue the war (which has been forced upon us) to the bitter end, if necessary; at the same time, prompted by the desire to avoid further bloodshed and make an end of the atrocities of war, the four allied [Central] Powers propose to enter forthwith into peace negotiations.

On what terms Germany was ready at this time to enter into peace is not known. In respect to this point, the note said nothing except that—

The propositions which they [the four Central Powers] bring forward for such negotiation, and which have for their object a guarantee

of the existence, of the honor, and of the freedom of the development of these [the Central] nations, are, according to their firm belief, appropriate terms for the establishment of a lasting peace.

In the note which the German Government sent at the same time to the Pope, its aims were expressed as follows:

Germany is carrying on a war of defense against her enemies, which aim at her destruction. She fights to assure the integrity of her frontiers and the liberty of the German nation, for the right which she claims to develop freely her intellectual and economic energies in peaceable competition and on an equal footing with other nations.⁽¹⁾

Such an offer, clearly, could have been made only by those who felt that they had the upper hand. It was not an offer of terms; but an offer to stop the war on condition that the Allies should signify a willingness to accept such terms as Germany might propose. For the Entente to have accepted the offer of a peace conference under the circumstances would have been equivalent to an "unconditional surrender" to Germany.

Reply of the Allied Governments.—So at least the Allied Governments regarded the matter. The French minister, Briand, denounced the offer as a "trap"; and Premier Lloyd George, speaking in the House of Commons on December 19, 1916, declared that—

To enter on the invitation of Germany, proclaiming herself victorious, without any knowledge of the proposals she intends to make, into a conference, is putting our heads into a noose with the rope end in the hands of the Germans.

As to the objects of Great Britain in the war, he quoted Lincoln's statement: "We accepted the war for an object, a worthy object. The war will end when that object is attained. Under God I hope it will never end until that time." More specifically, he stated the terms of Great Britain and her allies to be "complete restitution, full reparation, and effective guarantees." The formal reply to the German offer was contained in a joint note of all the Allied Governments, December 30, 1916. The Allies refused to "consider a proposal which is empty and insincere." They declared that "no peace is possible so long as they have not secured reparation for violated rights and liberties, the recognition of the rights of nationality and of the free existence of small states, so long as they have not brought about a settlement

⁽¹⁾ N. Y. Times, *Current History*, X. 588, 589.

calculated to end once and for all forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations, and to afford the only effective guarantee for the future security of the world." (2)

The reply of the Allies amounted only to a refusal to enter into peace negotiations until they had attained the objects for which they went to war. What these objects were are stated only in the most general terms: they would have reparation for injury done; they would have security for themselves and for small nations against a like offense.

President Wilson's Note (December 18, 1916).—It was at this stage that President Wilson addressed a note to the belligerent nations. The note was dated December 18, 1916—that is to say, six days after the German proposal for a peace conference was issued; but the note had been written, or at least determined upon, before that date, and the President was careful to say that his action was in no way associated with the overtures of the Central Powers. In his note the President pointed out that each side professed to be fighting a defensive war; each side professed to be the champion of small nations; each side professed to be "ready to consider the formation of a League of nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world."

Thus the objects for which both sides were fighting, "*stated in general terms . . . seem to be the same.*" The President felt justified therefore in asking the belligerent powers if it would not be possible for them to avow the "precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people." The President felt justified in making this request, because the United States was "as vitally and directly interested as the Governments now at war" in the "*measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world.*"

This note had a double significance. It assumed that something more was necessary for assuring "the future peace of the world" than the mere negotiation of particular peace treaties between the belligerents; and it asserted that in this larger question the United States would have something to say. The note amounted to saying that the war ought to result, not merely in the establishment of a satisfactory peace between the belligerents,

(2) N. Y. Times, *Current History*, X. 592, 801.

but in the establishment of a new international order in which all nations would take part.

The request of President Wilson elicited only a perfunctory reply from the Central Powers.⁽³⁾ The Allied Governments replied in a joint note dated Paris, January 10, 1917. They declared, "in a general way," their "whole-hearted agreement with the proposal to establish a League of Nations which shall assure peace and justice throughout the world." In addition, they defined their objects in the war in the following terms:

Their objects will not be made known in detail, with all the equitable compensation and indemnities for damages suffered, until the hour of negotiations. But the civilized world knows that they imply, in all necessity and in the first instance, the restoration of Belgium, of Serbia, and of Montenegro, and the indemnities which are due them; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of Russia, and of Roumania, with just reparation; the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable settlement, based alike upon the principle of nationalities, on the right which all peoples, whether small or great, have to the enjoyment of full security and free economic development, and also upon territorial agreements and international arrangements so framed as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations; the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Roumanians, of Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of populations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, decidedly alien to Western civilization. The intentions of his Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, regarding Poland, have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his armies. It goes without saying that if the Allies wish to liberate Europe from the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism, it never has been their design, as has been alleged, to encompass the extermination of the German peoples and their political disappearance. ⁽⁴⁾

In requesting the belligerents to declare precisely what they were fighting for, the President had a very definite object in view. He was not, as he said in his note, proposing mediation, or even peace. He was seeking for information in order that the United States might adopt a wise policy in respect to the war. The attitude of the United States towards the war would depend largely upon what the belligerents were fighting for. The

⁽³⁾ They renewed their proposal for a peace conference, and said that when peace was established they would willingly "coöperate with the United States" in the "sublime task" of preventing future wars. (N. Y. Times *Current History*, X, 783.)

⁽⁴⁾ N. Y. Times, *Current History*, X, 789.

President was severely criticised at the time for seeming not to know what the war was about, for seeming to think that the issues of the war were in doubt and that the belligerents were fighting for the same ends. It is no longer necessary to say that the President knew, better than most men, what the war was about. What he said in his note was that the aims of the belligerents, *as stated in general terms, seem to be the same*. He was not trying to find out what the war was about, but how the belligerents would be willing to end it. The President was looking beyond the war to the peace, and beyond the peace to the measures which might be taken to make it an enduring one.

Address to the Senate (January 22, 1917).—The direct result of the replies which were received was the notable address of January 22, 1917, in which the President discussed this all important question and the attitude which the United States should take in respect to it:

The Central Powers [he said] united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss the terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must hereafter hold the world at peace. . . . I have sought this opportunity . . . to disclose to you the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among nations.

In such an enterprise, the President said, it was inconceivable that the United States "should play no part." In such an enterprise the people of the United States had a service to perform.

That service is nothing less than this, to add their authority and their power to the authority and force of other nations to guarantee peace and justice throughout the world. Such a settlement cannot now be long postponed. It is right that before it comes this Government should frankly formulate the conditions upon which it would feel justified in asking our people to approve its formal and solemn adherence to a League for Peace. I am here to attempt to state those conditions.

The first of those conditions was that the present war must be ended. But to the United States it made a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it was ended:

I take it for granted that mere terms of peace between the belligerents will not satisfy even the belligerents themselves. Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement, so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.

The terms of the immediate peace agreed upon will determine whether it is a peace for which such a guarantee can be secured. The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: Is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power? If it be only a struggle for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stable equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace.

This common peace must be based upon an equality of nations and of national rights. But—

There is a deeper thing involved than even an equality of right among organized nations. No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. . . . Any peace which does not recognize and accept this principle will inevitably be upset. It will not rest upon the affections or the conviction of mankind. The ferment of spirit of whole populations will fight subtly and constantly against it, and all the world will sympathize. The world can be at peace only if its life is stable, and there can be no stability where the will is in rebellion, where there is not tranquility of spirit and a sense of justice, of freedom, and of right.

Besides the equality of nations organized upon the principle of popular government, there must also be, so far as possible, freedom of the seas and free access to the seas.

The freedom of the seas is the *sine qua non* of peace, equality, and coöperation. No doubt a somewhat radical reconsideration of many of the rules of international practice hitherto thought to be established may be necessary in order to make the seas indeed free and common in practically all circumstances for the use of mankind, but the motive

for such changes is convincing and compelling. . . . It need not be difficult either to define or to secure the freedom of the seas if the Governments of the world sincerely desire to come to an agreement concerning it.

It is a problem closely connected with limitation of naval armaments and the coöperation of the navies of the world in keeping the seas at once free and safe. And the question of limiting naval armaments opens the wider and perhaps more difficult question of the limitation of armies and of all programs of military preparation. Difficult as these questions are, they must be faced with the utmost candor and decided in a spirit of real accommodation, if peace is to come with healing in its wings, and come to stay. Peace cannot be had without concession and sacrifice. . . . The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensely practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and mankind.

These were the conditions upon which the United States might be expected to coöperate with European nations in guaranteeing the peace of the world. The President was of course speaking primarily for the United States; but—

I hope and believe that I am in effect speaking for liberals and friends of humanity in every nation and of every program of liberty. I would fain believe that I am speaking for the silent mass of mankind everywhere who have as yet had no opportunity to speak their real hearts out concerning the death and ruin they see to have come already upon the persons and homes they hold most dear. . . . I speak with the greater boldness and confidence because it is clear to every man who can think that there is in this promise no breach in either our traditions or our policy as a nation, but a fulfilment, rather, of all that we have professed or striven for. I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world: that no nation should seek to extend its policy over any other nation or people, but that every people should be left free to determine its own policy, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and powerful. . . .

These are American principles, American policies. We could stand for no others. They are also the principles and policies of forward looking men and women everywhere, of every modern nation, of every enlightened community. They are the principles of mankind and must prevail.

II

THE PAPAL PEACE OVERTURES OF 1917

New Events in 1917.—Early in 1917 two events occurred which gave a new direction to the war. These were the Russian

Revolution, and the declaration by the United States of war against Germany, April 6, 1917.

The general effect of these events was to bring into clearer light the fundamental issues of the war. Hitherto the Governments of France and England had claimed to be fighting the cause of democracy and freedom against autocracy and military aggression; and yet they were allied with the Government of Russia, an absolute despotism which was notorious for its suppression of popular rights. The Russian Revolution removed the tremendous moral handicap of trying to fight a war of freedom in alliance with the chief enemy of freedom. At the same time, the entrance of the United States into the war, obviously without any desire for territorial or material advantages, but in defense of its own rights and for the vindication of just and humane principles, cleared the way for the renunciation, on the part of the Allies, of all imperialistic aims. More than ever before, the war came to be regarded as a clear cut conflict between two ideals—the ideal of democracy and the rights of peoples to determine their own way of life, over against the German ideal of a world empire established by ruthless military aggression and maintained by the power of the sword.

As a result of this clarification of the issues of the war, the sentiment of the whole world, now as never before, came to the support of the Allied cause. Between April 6 and December 8, 1917, sixteen states, small and great, declared war against Germany or severed diplomatic relations with her. Meantime, during the spring and summer of 1917, the military situation of the Allies was greatly improved. The Germans were pushed back on the western front to the Hindenburg line. The British captured Bagdad and advanced towards Jerusalem; and these victories, together with the active coöperation of Russia in Asia Minor, seemed to point to a decisive campaign against the Ottoman Empire.

Reichstag Resolutions of 1917.—These events resulted in the first internal political crisis which had occurred in Germany since the war began. On July 11, 1917, the Reichstag refused to vote the war credits pending the solution of the ministerial question; and on July 19, after the resignation of Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg and the accession of Michaelis to that

office, a declaration was voted (214 to 116) by the majority, composed chiefly of the Center Party and the Socialists, which is known as the Reichstag Resolutions of 1917. The substance of these resolutions is as follows:

(1) Germany took up arms in self defense "for the integrity of its territories." (2) The Reichstag labors for peace and "lasting reconciliation among the nations." (3) "Forced acquisitions of territory, and political, economic, and financial violations, are incompatible with such a peace." (4) The Reichstag rejects all plans "aiming at an economic blockade and the stirring up of enmity among the peoples after the war." (5) "The freedom of the seas must be assured." (6) "The Reichstag will energetically promote the creation of international juridical organizations."

Papal Note of August 14, 1917.—It may have been these events in Germany that led the Pope to suppose that the time was ripe for peace. At all events he prepared, on August 1, 1917, the text of a note to be sent to all the belligerents. This note, which was not sent till August 14, was a strong appeal to all the powers to bring the war to a close on the basis of mutual concession and compromise; and with this in view the Pope ventured to propose certain principles "which seem to offer the basis of a just and lasting peace." These principles were the following:

(1) "The fundamental point must be that the material force of arms shall give way to the moral force of right, whence shall proceed a just agreement of all upon a simultaneous and reciprocal decrease of armaments." (2) "Taking the place of arms, the institution of arbitration, with its high pacifying function, according to rules to be drawn in concert, and under sanctions to be determined against any state which should decline either to refer international questions to arbitration or to accept its awards." (3) "The true community and freedom of the seas." (4) "As for damages . . . we see no other way . . . than by setting up the principle of entire and reciprocal condonation." (5) "Territory now occupied [to be] reciprocally restituted. Therefore, on the part of Germany, there should be total evacuation of Belgium, with guarantees of its entire political, military, and economic independence towards any power whatever; evacuation also of French territory; on the part of the other belligerents, a similar restitution of the German colonies." (6) In respect to the Balkans and Poland and Armenia, the Pope spoke of regarding, as far as possible, "the aspirations of the populations." (5)

Replies of German and Austrian Governments.—The official

⁵ N. Y. Times, *Current History*, XII. 392.

reply of the German Government to the Papal overtures was made public September 22, 1917. It began by relating with fulsome self-praise the efforts of the Kaiser to preserve peace from the time of his accession in 1888, and particularly at the opening of the present war; and asserted that the—

Imperial Government greets with special sympathy the leading idea of the peace appeal wherein his Holiness clearly expresses the conviction that in the future the material power of arms must be superseded by the moral power of right. . . . From this would follow, according to his Holiness' view, the simultaneous diminution of the armed forces of all states and the institution of obligatory arbitration for international disputes. We share his Holiness' views that definite rules . . . for a . . . limitation of armaments on land, on sea, and in the air, as well as for the true freedom and community of the high seas, are the things in treating which the new spirit, that in the future should prevail in international relations, should find first hopeful expression. . . . The Imperial Government will in this respect support every proposal compatible with the vital interest of the German Empire and people.

The reply of the Austro-Hungarian Government, published at the same time, was couched in similar phrases. It is to be noted that in its reply the German Government commits itself to nothing except that it will support every proposal *compatible with the vital interest of the German Empire and people.*⁽⁶⁾

President Wilson's Reply to the Pope.—The Allied governments made no formal reply to the Papal note; but it was semi-officially announced by Great Britain, France, Russia, and Italy that President Wilson's reply of August 27, 1917, which was immediately published, expressed in letter and spirit their views. President Wilson, speaking on behalf of the United States, began by stating that—

His Holiness in substance proposes that we return to the *status quo ante bellum*, and that then there be a general condonation, disarmament, and a concert of nations based upon an acceptance of the principle of arbitration; that, by a similar concert, freedom of the seas be established; and that the territorial claims of France and Italy, the perplexing problems of the Balkan states, and the restitution of Poland, be left to such conciliatory adjustments as may be possible in the new temper of such a peace, due regard being paid to the aspirations of the peoples whose political fortunes and affiliations will be involved.

With the Papal ideal of a reconstructed Europe the President

⁽⁶⁾ What Germans considered to be their "vital interests" is indicated in Appendix I.

was in thorough accord; but he thought it obvious that such a program could not be carried out unless "the restitution of the *status quo ante* furnishes a firm and satisfactory basis for it." The President thought that the *status quo ante* furnished no satisfactory basis for any stable peace, to say nothing of a league of Nations; and his reply to the Pope is taken up chiefly with giving two reasons for that belief.

The first great difficulty was the character of the German Government and the ambitions and ideals of the rulers, as distinct from the people, of Germany.

The object of this war is to deliver the free peoples of the world from the menace and the actual power of a vast military establishment controlled by an irresponsible Government which, having secretly planned to dominate the world, proceeded to carry the plan out without regard either to the sacred obligations of treaty or the long-established practices and long-cherished principles of international action and honor; which chose its own time for the war; delivered its blow fiercely and suddenly; stopped at no barrier either of law or of mercy; swept a whole continent within the tide of blood—not the blood of soldiers only, but the blood of innocent women and children also and of the helpless poor; and now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world. This power is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people. . . . To deal with such a power by way of peace upon the plan proposed by His Holiness the Pope would, so far as we can see, involve a recuperation of its strength and a renewal of its policy; would make it necessary to create a permanent hostile combination of nations against the German people, who are its instruments; and would result in abandoning the new-born Russia to the intrigue, the manifold subtle interference, and the certain counter-revolution which would be attempted by all the malign influences to which the German Government has of late accustomed the world. Can peace be based upon a restitution of its power or upon any word of honor it could pledge in a treaty of settlement and accommodation? . . . The test, therefore, of every plan of peace is this: Is it based upon the faith of all the peoples involved or merely upon the word of an ambitious and intriguing Government, on the one hand, and of a group of free peoples, on the other? This is a test which goes to the root of the matter; and it is the test which must be applied. . . . We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitution of small

nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers.

This was the first and vital obstacle to the establishment of a durable peace at that time. But there is another point which is touched upon, rather lightly, by the President in his reply to the Pope; and that is that any attempt to establish a new international order, or even to establish a permanent peace, implied the adoption of different principles, in respect to economic and political practice, than had been commonly followed in the past:

Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest securely upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort, or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury. The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people, who have themselves suffered all things in this war, which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of Governments—the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful—their equal right to freedom and security and self-government, and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the German people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek domination. . . .

The purposes of the United States in this war are known to the whole world, to every people to whom the truth has been permitted to come. They do not need to be stated again. We seek no material advantage of any kind. We believe that the intolerable wrongs done in this war by the furious and brutal power of the Imperial German Government ought to be repaired, but not at the expense of the sovereignty of any people—rather a vindication of the sovereignty both of those that are weak and of those that are strong. Punitive damages, the dismemberment of empires, the establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we deem inexpedient and in the end worse than futile, no proper basis for a peace of any kind, least of all for an enduring peace. That must be based upon justice and fairness and the common rights of mankind.

The President's reply to the Pope looked beyond the immediate question of whether it would be possible to patch up a peace between the various belligerents. It was concerned with the larger question of the conditions necessary for the establishment of permanent peace. In a certain sense, therefore, it prepared the way for the much more thorough-going discussion of these

questions which grew out of the invitation to attend the Brest-Litovsk conference.

III

THE BREST-LITOVSK PEACE DISCUSSION OF 1918

The Brest-Litovsk Conference.—Three months after the Papal peace overtures, an event occurred which soon placed the Central Powers in a position which enabled them once more to make an offer of peace to their enemies. November 7, 1917, the Government of Kerensky was overthrown, and the Bolsheviki, under the lead of Lenine and Trotzky, became the masters of Russia. Russia was already at the point of economic exhaustion; and the new regime hastened to renounce the treaties with the Allies, and on December 15, 1917, negotiated a separate armistice with Germany with a view to immediate peace. The famous conference which followed at Brest-Litovsk (December 22, 1917, to February 10, 1918), resulted directly in the humiliating treaty which opened Russia to German exploitation. But it also gave rise to the most extended statements of peace terms, both by Germany and the Allied Governments, which had as yet been made.

The initiative in this movement was taken by the Bolsheviki themselves. The leaders of the Russian Government appear to have believed that the conference at Brest-Litovsk would lead to the negotiation of a general peace between all the belligerents. With this end in view, the Russian agents at Brest-Litovsk presented fifteen points, which were so wide in their scope as to constitute the basis for a general peace. The substance of the proposal is as follows:⁽⁷⁾

- (1) Evacuation of Russia, and autonomy for Poland and the Lithuanian and Lettish provinces. (2) Autonomy for Turkish Armenia.
- (3) Free plebiscite for Alsace-Lorraine. (4) Restoration of Belgium and indemnification from an international fund. (5) The same for Serbia and Montenegro; access to the sea for Serbia, autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. (6) Plebiscites for other contested Balkan territories. (7) The restoration of Roumania, with autonomy for the Dobrudja. (8) A plebiscite for the Trentino and Trieste. (9) Restoration of the German colonies. (10) The restoration of Persia and Greece. (11) Neutralization of the maritime straits leading to inland seas, and

(7) N. Y. Times, *Current History*, February, 1918, p. 284.

of the Suez and Panama canals; freedom of commercial navigation; torpedoing of commercial ships forbidden. (12) No indemnities, and war contributions to be refunded. (13) No special customs agreements and no commercial boycotts after the war. (14) Peace to be negotiated at a congress of delegates chosen by representative bodies; no secret treaties. (15) Gradual disarmament on land and sea; militia to replace standing armies.

The Central Powers had no intention of negotiating a peace, either with Russia or with any other country, on such bases as those presented by the Bolsheviks. But the collapse of Russia had so far improved their position that they would have liked nothing better than to draw the Western belligerents into a peace conference. In other words, the Central Powers were ready, in December, 1917, to enter into peace negotiations for precisely the same reason that they were in December, 1916—because they felt strong enough to enforce their own terms, as they in fact did enforce their own terms on Russia by the Brest-Litovsk treaties.

With this idea in mind, Count Czernin, speaking for the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, on December 25, made a statement intended as a basis upon which the Allied Governments might join in the negotiations then under way with Russia. He said that the Central Powers "are agreed immediately to conclude a general peace without forcible annexations and indemnities," and that they believed that the "six clauses proposed by the Russian delegation" (only the first six of the fifteen proposals of the Russian agents had at that time been made public) might become the basis of such a general peace. Nevertheless, this Christmas gift to the Allies was made with reservations; for Count Czernin added that in respect to these six proposals it was necessary to make certain observations. These observations, which stated the conditions on which the Central Powers would accept the six points as the basis of peace, were in substance as follows:⁽⁸⁾

(1) Forcible annexation was not intended by the Central Powers, but the question of evacuation of territory now occupied must be left to the final treaty. (2) The Central Powers did not intend to deprive of independence those countries that lost it during the war. (3) The status of nationalities not independent cannot be settled internationally, but must be left to the particular Governments concerned.

(8) N. Y. Times, *Current History*, February, 1918, p. 262.

(4) "Protection of the rights of minorities constitutes an essential component part of the constitutional rights of peoples to self-determination," and the Central Powers "grant validity to this principle everywhere, so far as it is practically realizable." (5) The Central Powers "have frequently emphasized the possibility that both sides might renounce not only indemnification for war costs, but also . . . for war damages." (6) Germany cannot renounce her colonies "under any circumstances." In addition to these six points, the Central Powers "approved wholly" the "principle of economic relations proposed by the Russian delegation."

These "observations" transformed the Russian proposals into something quite different; they meant essentially that the settlement of Alsace-Lorraine and Poland must be left to the Central Powers, and that while they did not intend to annex Belgium or the Baltic Provinces or Serbia or Roumania, the question of whether these countries were to be evacuated or not must be left to the final treaty. The treaty of Brest-Litovsk is a concrete instance of the way in which Germany applied her peace "principles" in actual practice. (See Appendix II.)

Lloyd George on British War Aims.—It was this proposal of Count Czernin that elicited the address of Lloyd George of January 6, and the address of President Wilson of January 8, 1918. These two addresses contain the most specific avowals of peace terms which had as yet been made by the governments fighting Germany. Lloyd George's address, which was made before the Trade Union Conference, may be summarized as follows:⁽⁹⁾

(1) Great Britain is not fighting a "war of aggression," and has no desire to disrupt Germany or destroy the German Government. The reform of the German Government, much as "we consider that military and autocratic constitution a dangerous anachronism," is a "question for the German people to decide." (2) "We are not fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary, or to deprive Turkey of its capital or the rich lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish." (3) The proposals of the Central Powers are either a refusal to concede anything, or are too vague to become the basis of discussion. (4) The fundamental conditions of peace are: (a) Complete restoration of the "independence of Belgium and such reparation as can be made for the devastation of its towns and villages. This is no demand for a war indemnity." (b) "Restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Roumania." (c) "We stand by the French democracy to the death in the demand it

(9) N. Y. Times, *Current History*, February, 1918, p. 226.

makes for a reconsideration of the great wrong of 1871." (d) Great Britain, without reproaching the present rulers of Russia, cannot be "held accountable for decisions taken in her absence and concerning which she has not been consulted." (e) "An independent Poland, comprising all those genuinely Polish elements who desire to form a part of it, is an urgent necessity for the stability of Western Europe." (f) "A break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims," but peace cannot be established upon a secure basis unless the democratic aspirations of the "Austro-Hungarian nationalities" are realized. (g) "We regard as vital the legitimate claims of Italians for union with those of their own race," and "mean to press that justice be done to the men of Roumanian blood and speech." (h) Turkey may keep Constantinople, but the straits should be neutralized, and "Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine are entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditions." (i) Colonies should be placed under "an administration acceptable to themselves, one of whose main purposes will be to prevent their exploitation for the benefit of European capitalists or governments." (j) "Reparation must be made for injuries done in violation of international law." (k) "A great attempt must be made to establish, by some international organization, an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes."

President Wilson's Fourteen Points (January 8, 1918).—The address of President Wilson was delivered before the Congress of the United States. It was in this address that he stated the famous "fourteen points" which constituted the program of the United States, because they constituted "the program of the world's peace." The fourteen points are stated as follows:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. *A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.*

VI. *The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.*

VII. *Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.*

VIII. *All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored; and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.*

IX. *A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.*

X. *The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.*

XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guaranties of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guaranties.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed, under specific covenants, for the purpose of affording mutual guaranties of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In regard to these essential rectifications of wrong and assertions of right we feel ourselves to be intimate partners of all the Governments and peoples associated together against the imperialists. We cannot be separated in interest or divided in purpose. We stand together until the end.

In respect to specific questions of territorial restoration and the rights of nationality, the only marked difference between the speech of the British Premier and the American President is in respect to Russia. But aside from this, the President's address lays great emphasis on the conditions necessary to the establishment of a new international order. These conditions are stated in points 1 to 5, and in point 14.

Count von Hertling's Reply.—January 24, 1918, the German Chancellor, Count von Hertling, in an address before the Reichstag, replied to the addresses of Lloyd George and President Wilson. The significance of this address is that it was the first statement by the German Government which could be called in any sense specific. In his reply to Lloyd George, the Chancellor confined himself mainly to the Alsace-Lorraine question. He explained that Alsace-Lorraine was not strictly annexed to Germany in 1871; it was only "disannexed" from France, who had formerly wrested it by conquest from Germany. The main part of the Chancellor's address was devoted to President Wilson's fourteen points, which he takes up one by one. The substance of his remarks is as follows:⁽¹³⁾

(1) The negotiations at Brest-Litovsk prove "that we are quite ready to accept this proposal [President Wilson's first point, on no secret international agreements] and declare publicity of negotiations to be a general political principle."

(2) There is "no difference of opinion" with Mr. Wilson in respect to his second point, on freedom of the seas; but to realize this it would be well if the fortifications at Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Hong-Kong, and other places should be removed.

(3) The Central Powers are "in thorough accord with the removal of economic barriers which interfere with trade in a superfluous manner" and "condemn economic war."

(4) "The idea of limitation of armaments is entirely discussable."

(5) As to colonies, "Mr. Wilson's principles will encounter some difficulties in the realm of reality," but the "reconstitution of the world's colonial possessions" will "have to be discussed in due time."

(6) In respect to evacuation of Russian territory, "we are dealing with questions which concern only Russia and the four allied [Central] Powers."

(7) "The Belgian question belongs to those questions the details of which are to be settled by war and peace negotiations (*Kriegs- und Friedensverhandlungen*)."

(8) "The occupied parts of France are a valuable pawn in our hands; . . . forcible annexation forms no part of the official German policy."

(9 to 12) Mr. Wilson's points 9 to 12 touch chiefly Austria and Turkey.

(13) "It may be left to Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Poland to come to an agreement on the future constitution" of Poland.

(14) The German Government "is gladly ready, *when all other pending questions have been settled, to begin the examination of the basis of . . . a bond of nations.*"

⁽¹³⁾ N. Y. Times, *Current History*, March, 1918, p. 389.

President Wilson's Address of February 11, 1918.—In a second address before Congress, February 11, 1918, President Wilson made a searching analysis of Chancellor Hertling's address, which he found "very vague and very confusing. . . . It confirms, I am sorry to say, rather than removes the unfortunate impressions made by what we had learned of the conferences of Brest-Litovsk." The essential weakness of the Chancellor's address was in fact this: "His discussion and acceptance of our general principles lead him to no practical conclusions. He refuses to apply them to the substantive items which constitute the body of any final settlement." Having analyzed, from this point of view, the Chancellor's address in some detail, the President declared four fundamental principles underlying the fourteen peace points:

After all, the test of whether it is possible for either Government to go any further in this comparison of views is simple and obvious. The principles to be applied are these:

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a peace that will be permanent;

Second, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power; but that—

Third, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned, and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims amongst rival states; and—

Fourth, that all well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world.

A general peace erected upon such foundations can be discussed. Until such a peace can be secured we have no choice but to go on. So far as we can judge, these principles that we regard as fundamental are already everywhere accepted as imperative, except among the spokesmen of the military and annexationist party in Germany.

Chancellor von Hertling (February 25, 1918).—To President Wilson's address of February 11, Chancellor von Hertling replied in an address to the Reichstag on February 25. He could not find that his earlier offers had been "received in hostile

countries objectively and without prejudice. Moreover, discussion in an intimate gathering alone could lead to understanding on many . . . questions which can really be settled only by compromise. . . . We do not contemplate retaining Belgium, but . . . we must be safeguarded from the danger" of Belgium's becoming after the war the "jumping-off ground of enemy machinations." The Chancellor's reply to President Wilson's four principles is in substance as follows: (1) He admits readily that "each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case." (2) President Wilson's second point "can be unconditionally assented to. . . . One might think that he [Wilson] is laboring under the illusion that there exists in Germany an antagonism between an autocratic government and a mass of people without rights." As to the balance of power, "it was England who invented the principle." (3) President Wilson's third point is only a deduction from the foregoing, "and is therefore included in the assent given to that clause." (4) "I can give assent in principle, and I declare, therefore, with President Wilson, that a general peace on such a basis is discussable." Count Czernin, in an address to the Vienna city council, April 2, touched upon President Wilson's address of February 11, so far as to say that he entirely agreed with von Hertling that Mr. Wilson's four points "are the basis on which a general peace can be discussed." He saw no other "obstacle to peace than France's desire for Alsace-Lorraine," and as the French Government had recently asserted that it could negotiate only on the basis of the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, "there was then no choice left."⁽¹⁴⁾

IV

PRESIDENT WILSON'S LATER STATEMENTS ON TERMS OF PEACE

In all of President Wilson's declarations concerning peace, the outstanding fact has been the subordination of the particular peace between the belligerents to what he regards as the most important object of all—the establishment of a new international

⁽¹⁴⁾ N. Y. Times, *Current History*, April, 1918, p. 99. For statement of peace terms by France and other Allied countries, and by Bulgaria, see Appendix III.

order. He has throughout enunciated principles and outlined specific terms which in his opinion are essential if the final peace is to be one which shall prepare the way for the reorganization of the world on a coöperative instead of a competitive basis. One of these essential principles is that no Government can be in harmony with the ruling ideals of modern times unless it is based essentially upon the "consent of the governed"; and hence the league of nations, to which the President looks forward, can have slight chance of success unless it is a League of Nations of which the Governments are subject to the popular will.

German Autocracy an Obstacle to Peace.—One great obstacle, therefore, to the attainment of a stable peace and to the organization of a league of nations is the autocratic character of the German Government. From the first President Wilson has distinguished between the German people and the German Government. "We have no quarrel with the German people," he said in the address to Congress of April 2, 1917. In his reply to the Pope he said that the power which we fight—the power "which now stands balked but not defeated, the enemy of four-fifths of the world"—this power "is not the German people. It is the ruthless master of the German people." This power it was that began the war, and this power is the chief obstacle to peace not only, and perhaps not primarily, because it is an irresponsible power, a power not based upon the consent of the governed, but because it is a power whose cynical disregard of its pledged word destroys beforehand the value of any agreement it might enter into.

If anything were necessary to make this clear, it would have been furnished by the brazen duplicity of the German Government in its dealings with Russia during and after the peace of Brest-Litovsk. A German politician, writing in the *Vienna Arbeiter Zeitung* of August 27, 1918, stated the exact fact when he said: "We have brought about treaties of peace in Brest and Bucharest [Roumania] which corresponded to our 'interest,' but not to our principles as we presented them in the peace offers." The effect of the German treatment of Russia could only be to confirm the President's distrust of the present German Government. He has from the first taken a special interest in the Russian Revolution; and in his January 8 address he said that

"the treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy." Tried by this test, the German Government was condemned without appeal.

President's Address of July 4, 1918. It is not strange, therefore, that in his recent peace addresses the thing which stands out particularly is the emphasis which President Wilson lays upon the character of the German Government, upon its lack of all honor and probity, and upon the necessity of ignoring it and ultimately of getting rid of it altogether. This point might be regarded as the distinguishing feature of the addresses of July 4 and September 27, 1918. The essential passages of the address of July 4 are as follows:

There can be but one issue. The settlement must be final. There can be no compromise. No halfway decision would be tolerable. No halfway decision is conceivable. These are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting and which must be conceded them before there can be peace:

(1) *The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.*

(2) *The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.*

(3) *The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct toward each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern states in their relations with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed, no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a*

mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

(4) *The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.*

These great objects can be put into a single sentence. **What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.** These great ends cannot be achieved by debating and seeking to reconcile and accommodate what statesmen may wish, with their projects for balances of power and of national opportunity. They can be realized only by the determination of what the thinking peoples of the world desire, with their longing hope for justice and for social freedom and opportunity. I can fancy that the air of this place [Mt. Vernon] carries the accents of such principles with a peculiar kindness. Here were started forces which the great nation against which they were primarily directed at first regarded as a revolt against its rightful authority, but which it has long since seen to have been a step in the liberation of its own people as well as of the people of the United States; and I stand here now to speak—speak proudly and with confident hope—of the spread of this revolt, this liberation, to the great stage of the world itself! The blinded rulers of Prussia have roused forces they knew little of—forces which once roused, can never be crushed to earth again; for they have at heart an inspiration and a purpose which are deathless and of the very stuff of triumph!

His New York Address (September 27).—In the New York address of September 27 it is made even more explicit that the Allies and the United States can have no dealings with the German Government, because it is a government which in practice is faithless and in principle is undemocratic. These points are revealed in the following passages:

Shall the military power of any nation or group of nations be suffered to determine the fortunes of peoples over whom they have no right to rule except the right of force?

Shall strong nations be free to wrong weak nations and make them subject to their purpose and interest?

Shall peoples be ruled and dominated, even in their own internal affairs, by arbitrary and irresponsible force or by their own will and choice?

Shall there be a common standard of right and privilege for all peoples and nations or shall the strong do as they will and the weak suffer without redress?

Shall the assertion of right be haphazard and by casual alliance, or shall there be a common concert to oblige the observance of common rights?

No man, no group of men, chose these to be the issues of the struggle. They *are* the issues of it; and they must be settled,—by no arrangement or compromise or adjustment of interests, but definitely and once for all and with a full and unequivocal acceptance of the principle that the interest of the weakest is as sacred as the interest of the strongest.

This is what we mean when we speak of a permanent peace, if we speak sincerely, intelligently, and with a real knowledge and comprehension of the matter we deal with.

We are all agreed that there can be no peace obtained by any kind of bargain or compromise with the Governments of the Central Empires, because we have dealt with them already and have seen them deal with other Governments that were parties to this struggle, at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. They have convinced us that they are without honor and do not intend justice. They observe no covenants, accept no principle but force and their own interest. We cannot “come to terms” with them. They have made it impossible. The German people must by this time be fully aware that we cannot accept the word of those who forced this war upon us. We do not think the same thoughts or speak the same language of agreement.

In this address of September 27 the President came back once more to the object which he has from the first regarded as fundamental—the League of Nations, and in this address he said that the League of Nations must be formed at the time of peace, neither before nor after:

And, as I see it, the constitution of that League of Nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It cannot be formed now. If formed now, it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee the peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought. The reason, to speak in plain terms again, why it must be guaranteed is that there will be parties to the peace whose promises have proved untrustworthy, and means must be found in connection with the peace settlement itself to remove that source of insecurity. It would be folly to leave the guarantee to the subsequent voluntary action of the Governments we have seen destroy Russia and deceive Roumania.

But these general terms do not disclose the whole matter. Some details are needed to make them sound less like a thesis and more like

a practical program. These, then, are some of the particulars, and I state them with the greater confidence because I can state them authoritatively as representing this Government's interpretation of its own duty with regard to peace:

First, the impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned;

Second, no special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all;

Third, there can be no leagues or alliances of special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations;

Fourth, and more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control;

Fifth, all international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

Special alliances and economic rivalries and hostilities have been the prolific source in the modern world of the plans and passions that produce war. It would be an insincere as well as an insecure peace that did not exclude them in definite and binding terms.

It will be noted that in the address of July 4, the President formulates the fundamental principles for which we are fighting under four heads; and in the address of September 27 he likewise formulated the conditions for peace under five heads. While the President's policy in respect to the world peace is not to be fully understood except by a careful examination of all that he has said on the subject, the substance of that policy is to be found in the twenty-three specific "points" or statements—the fourteen points of the address of January 8, the four points of the address

of July 4, and the five points of the address of September 27. Taken together, these twenty-three statements might be regarded as President Wilson's charter for the peace of the world.

President Wilson's addresses have generally been commended, more or less officially, by the Allied Governments, but perhaps never more specifically than by Lloyd George on July 5, 1918. Speaking to American troops in France, he said: "President Wilson's great deliverance of yesterday made clear what we are fighting for. If the Kaiser and his advisers are prepared tomorrow to accept the conditions stated by your President he can have peace, not only with America, but also with Great Britain and France."⁽¹⁵⁾

V

NEGOTIATIONS OF OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER, 1918

First German Note and the President's Reply.—The submission of the German Government was apparently nearer than could be foreseen at the time the President delivered his address of September 27. On October 5 there was transmitted to the United States a request from the German Government conceived in the following terms:

The German Government requests the President of the United States to take in hand the restoration of peace, acquaint all the belligerent states of this request, and invite them to send plenipotentiaries for the purpose of opening negotiations.

It accepts the program set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress on January 8, and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of September 27, as a basis for peace negotiations.

With a view to avoiding further bloodshed, the German Government requests the immediate conclusion of an armistice on land and water and in the air.

The reply of President Wilson (October 8) was strictly in accord with the ideas and principles which he had so often expressed. He said:

Before making reply to the request of the Imperial German Government, and in order that that reply shall be as candid and straightforward as the momentous interests involved require, the President of the United States deems it necessary to assure himself of the exact meaning of the note of the Imperial Chancellor. Does the Imperial

⁽¹⁵⁾ *London Times*, July 8, 1918.

Chancellor mean that the Imperial German Government accepts the terms laid down by the President in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January last and in subsequent addresses, and that its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?

The President feels bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated against the Central Powers so long as the armies of those Powers are upon their soil. The good faith of any discussion would manifestly depend upon the consent of the Central Powers immediately to withdraw their forces everywhere from invaded territory.

The President also feels that he is justified in asking whether the Imperial Chancellor is speaking merely for the constituted authorities of the Empire who have so far conducted the war. He deems the answer to these questions vital from every point of view.

Second German Note and Reply.—The reply of the German Government to these questions was transmitted October 12, and was as follows:

The German Government has accepted the terms laid down by President Wilson in his address of January the 8th and in his subsequent addresses on the foundation of a permanent peace of justice. Consequently its object in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application of these terms.

The German Government believes that the Governments of the powers associated with the Government of the United States also take the position taken by President Wilson in his address. The German Government, in accordance with the Austro-Hungarian Government, for the purpose of bringing about an armistice, declares itself ready to comply with the propositions of the President in regard to evacuation.

The German Government suggests that the President may occasion the meeting of a mixed commission for making the necessary arrangements concerning the evacuation. The present German Government, which has undertaken the responsibility for this step toward peace, has been formed by conferences and in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. The Chancellor, supported in all his actions by the will of this majority, speaks in the name of the German Government and of the German people.

On October 14 the President returned the following answer:

The unqualified acceptance by the present German Government and by a large majority of the German Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of the United States of America in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and

in his subsequent addresses, justifies the President in making a frank and direct statement of his decision with regard to the communications of the German Government of the 8th and 12th of October, 1918.

It must be clearly understood that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice are matters which must be left to the judgment and advice of the military advisers of the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments, and the President feels it his duty to say that no arrangement can be accepted by the Government of the United States which does not provide absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field. He feels confident that he can safely assume that this will also be the judgment and decision of the Allied Governments.

The President feels that it is also his duty to add that neither the Government of the United States nor, he is quite sure, the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent will consent to consider an armistice so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they still persist in. At the very time that the German Government approaches the Government of the United States with proposals of peace its submarines are engaged in sinking passenger ships at sea, and not the ships alone, but the very boats in which their passengers and crews seek to make their way to safety; and in their present enforced withdrawal from Flanders and France the German armies are pursuing a course of wanton destruction which has always been regarded as in direct violation of the rules and practices of civilized warfare. Cities and villages, if not destroyed, are being stripped of all they contain not only but often of their very inhabitants. The nations associated against Germany cannot be expected to agree to a cessation of arms while acts of inhumanity, spoliation, and desolation are being continued which they justly look upon with horror and with burning hearts.

It is necessary also, in order that there may be no possibility of misunderstanding, that the President should very solemnly call the attention of the Government of Germany to the language and plain intent of one of the terms of peace which the German Government has now accepted. It is contained in the address of the President delivered at Mt. Vernon on the Fourth of July last. It is as follows: "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it can not be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotence." The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it. The President's words just quoted naturally constitute a condition precedent to peace, if peace is to come by the action of the German people themselves. The President feels

bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgment, depend upon the definiteness and the satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter. It is indispensable that the Governments associated against Germany should know beyond a peradventure with whom they are dealing.

Austro-Hungarian Note and Reply.—Meantime, October 7, the Austro-Hungarian Government transmitted to the United States a request for an armistice, conceived in the following terms:

The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which has waged war always and solely as a defensive war and repeatedly given documentary evidence of its readiness to stop the shedding of blood and to arrive at a just and honorable peace, hereby addresses itself to his Lordship the President of the United States of America and offers to conclude with him and his Allies an armistice on every front on land, at sea, and in the air, and to enter immediately upon negotiations for a peace for which the fourteen points in the message of President Wilson to Congress of January 8, 1918, and the four points contained in President Wilson's address of February 12 [11], 1918, should serve as a foundation and in which the viewpoints declared by President Wilson in his address of September 27, 1918, will also be taken into account.

To this request, the following reply was sent, under date of October 18:

The President deems it his duty to say to the Austro-Hungarian Government that he cannot entertain the present suggestions of that Government because of certain events of utmost importance which, occurring since the delivery of his address of the 8th of January last, have necessarily altered the attitude and responsibility of the Government of the United States. Among the fourteen terms of peace which the President formulated at that time occurred the following:

"X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development."

Since that sentence was written and uttered to the Congress of the United States, the Government of the United States has recognized that a state of belligerency exists between the Czecho-Slovaks and the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, and that the Czecho-Slovak National Council is a *de facto* belligerent Government clothed with proper authority to direct the military and political affairs of the Czecho-Slovaks. It has also recognized in the fullest manner the justice of the nationalistic aspirations of the Jugo-Slavs for freedom.

The President is, therefore, no longer at liberty to accept the mere "autonomy" of these peoples as a basis of peace, but is obliged to insist

that they, and not he, shall be the judges of what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government will satisfy their aspirations and their conception of their rights and destiny as members of the family of nations.

Third German Note (October 20).—To the President's note of October 14, the German Government made the following reply, under date of October 20:

In accepting the proposal for an evacuation of the occupied territories the German Government has started from the assumption that the procedure of this evacuation and of the conditions of an armistice should be left to the judgment of the military advisers, and that the actual standard of power on both sides in the field has to form the basis for arrangements safeguarding and guaranteeing this standard. The German Government suggests to the President to bring about an opportunity for fixing the details. It trusts that the President of the United States will approve of no demand which would be irreconcilable with the honor of the German people and with opening a way to a peace of justice.

The German Government protests against the reproach of illegal and inhumane actions made against the German land and sea forces and thereby against the German people. For the covering of a retreat, destructions will always be necessary and are in so far permitted by international law. The German troops are under the strictest instructions to spare private property and to exercise care for the population to the best of their ability. Where transgressions occur in spite of these instructions the guilty are being punished.

The German Government further denies that the German navy in sinking ships has ever purposely destroyed lifeboats with their passengers. The German Government proposes with regard to all these charges that the facts be cleared up by neutral commissions. In order to avoid anything that might hamper the work of peace, the German Government has caused orders to be despatched to all submarine commanders precluding the torpedoing of passenger ships, without, however, for technical reasons, being able to guarantee that these orders will reach every single submarine at sea before its return.

As the fundamental conditions for peace, the President characterizes the destruction of every arbitrary power that can separately, secretly, and of its own single choice disturb the peace of the world. To this the German Government replies: Hitherto the representation of the people in the German Empire has not been endowed with an influence on the formation of the Government. The Constitution did not provide for a concurrence of the representation of the people in decisions on peace and war. These conditions have just now under-

gone a fundamental change. The new Government has been formed in complete accord with the wishes of the representation of the people, based on the equal, universal, secret, direct franchise. The leaders of the great parties of the Reichstag are members of this Government. In future no Government can take or continue in office without possessing the confidence of the majority of the Reichstag. The responsibility of the Chancellor of the Empire to the representation of the people is being legally developed and safeguarded. The first act of the new Government has been to lay before the Reichstag a bill to alter the Constitution of the Empire so that the consent of the representation of the people is required for decisions on war and peace. The permanence of the new system is, however, guaranteed not only by constitutional safeguards, but also by the unshakable determination of the German people, whose vast majority stands behind these reforms and demands their energetic continuance.

The question of the President, with whom he and the Governments associated against Germany are dealing, is therefore answered in a clear and unequivocal manner by the statement that the offer of peace and an armistice has come from a Government which, free from arbitrary and irresponsible influence, is supported by the approval of the overwhelming majority of the German people.

President Wilson's Reply (October 23).—To this communication the President replied, October 23, as follows:

Having received the solemn and explicit assurance of the German Government that it unreservedly accepts the terms of peace laid down in his address to the Congress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses, particularly the address of the 27th of September, and that it desires to discuss the details of their application, and that this wish and purpose emanate, not from those who have hitherto dictated German policy and conducted the present war on Germany's behalf, but from ministers who speak for the majority of the Reichstag and for an overwhelming majority of the German people; and having received also the explicit promise of the present German Government that the humane rules of civilized warfare will be observed both on land and sea by the German armed forces, the President of the United States feels that he cannot decline to take up with the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated the question of an armistice.

He deems it his duty to say again, however, that the only armistice he would feel justified in submitting for consideration would be one which should leave the United States and the powers associated with her in a position to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into and to make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. The President has, therefore, transmitted his correspondence with the

present German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments are disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as will fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and ensure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government has agreed, provided they deem such an armistice possible from the military point of view. Should such terms of armistice be suggested, their acceptance by Germany will afford the best concrete evidence of her unequivocal acceptance of the terms and principles of peace from which the whole action proceeds.

The President would deem himself lacking in candor did he not point out in the frankest possible terms the reason why extraordinary safeguards must be demanded. Significant and important as the constitutional changes seem to be which are spoken of by the German Foreign Secretary in his note of the 20th of October, it does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out, or that any guarantees either exist or are in contemplation that the alterations of principle and of practice now partially agreed upon will be permanent. Moreover, it does not appear that the heart of the present difficulty has been reached. It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing. It is evident that the German people have no means of commanding the acquiescence of the military authorities of the Empire in the popular will; that the power of the King of Prussia to control the policy of the Empire is unimpaired; that the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany.

Feeling that the whole peace of the world depends now on plain speaking and straightforward action, the President deems it his duty to say, without any attempt to soften what may seem harsh words, that the nations of the world do not and can not trust the word of those who have hitherto been the masters of German policy, and to point out once more that in concluding peace and attempting to undo the infinite injuries and injustices of this war the Government of the United States can not deal with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany. If it must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand, not peace negotiations, but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid.

Surrender of Austria-Hungary.—On October 28, the Austro-Hungarian Government transmitted the following statement in reply to the President's note of October 18:

In reply to the note of President Wilson of the 18th of this month, addressed to the Austro-Hungarian Government and giving the decision of the President to speak directly with the Austro-Hungarian Government on the question of an armistice and of peace, the Austro-Hungarian Government has the honor to declare that, equally with the preceding proclamations of the President, it adheres also to the same point of view contained in the last note upon the rights of the Austro-Hungarian peoples, especially those of the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs.

Consequently, Austria-Hungary, accepting all the conditions the President has laid down for the entry into negotiations for an armistice and peace, no obstacle exists, according to judgment of the Austro-Hungarian Government, to the beginning of these negotiations.

The Austro-Hungarian Government declares itself ready, in consequence, without awaiting the result of other negotiations, to enter into negotiations upon peace between Austria-Hungary and the states in the opposing group, and for an immediate armistice upon all Austro-Hungarian fronts.

It asks President Wilson to be so kind as to begin overtures on this subject.

The withdrawal of Bulgaria from the war by the armistice signed September 29, 1918, the growth of separatist movements within the Dual Monarchy, and a new drive launched by the Allies on the Italian front, on October 24, had made peace for Austria-Hungary a necessity. On the day following the above note to President Wilson, the Austro-Hungarian commanders sent a flag of truce to the Italians, who transmitted the accompanying request for an armistice to the Supreme War Council of the Allies, meeting at Versailles. On November 4, 1918, that body announced that the conditions laid down by it for an armistice had been accepted, and that thenceforth Austria-Hungary was out of the war. Turkey had concluded an armistice amounting to complete surrender on October 31. The German Empire alone was left in arms against the United States and the Governments associated with it.

Germany Referred to Marshal Foch.—November 5, 1918, the President transmitted, through Secretary Lansing, and the

Minister of Switzerland, the following note to the German Government:

"SIR:—I have the honor to request you to transmit the following communication to the German Government:

"In my note of October 23, 1918, I advised you that the President had transmitted his correspondence with the German authorities to the Governments with which the Government of the United States is associated as a belligerent, with the suggestion that, if those Governments were disposed to effect peace upon the terms and principles indicated, their military advisers and the military advisers of the United States be asked to submit to the Governments associated against Germany the necessary terms of such an armistice as would fully protect the interests of the peoples involved and insure to the associated Governments the unrestricted power to safeguard and enforce the details of the peace to which the German Government had agreed, provided they deemed such an armistice possible from the military point of view.

"The President is now in receipt of a memorandum of observations by the Allied Governments on this correspondence, which is as follows:

"The Allied Governments have given careful consideration to the correspondence which has passed between the President of the United States and the German Government. Subject to the qualifications which follow, they declare their willingness to make peace with the Government of Germany on the terms of peace laid down in the President's address to Congress of January, 1918, and the principles of settlement enunciated in his subsequent addresses.

"They must point out, however, that Clause 2, relating to what is usually described as the freedom of the seas, is open to various interpretations, some of which they could not accept. They must, therefore, reserve to themselves complete freedom on this subject when they enter the peace conference.

"Further, in the conditions of peace laid down in his address to Congress of January 8, 1918, the President declared that invaded territories must be restored as well as evacuated and freed. The Allied Governments feel that no doubt ought to be allowed to exist as to what this provision implies. By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air'.

"I am instructed by the President to say that he is in agreement with the interpretation set forth in the last paragraph of the memorandum above quoted. I am further instructed by the President to request you to notify the German Government that Marshal Foch has been authorized by the Government of the United States and the Allied Governments to receive properly accredited representatives of the German Government, and to communicate to them the terms of an armistice."

Armistice Terms Signed by Germany.—The representatives of the German Government appointed to negotiate an armistice received from Marshal Foch the terms on November 8. After conferring with German army headquarters and the Government at Berlin, and after receiving certain modifications of the terms from Marshal Foch, the armistice was signed, becoming effective at 11:00 a.m. (French time) on November 11. The terms of the armistice were chiefly concerned with provisions which would give to the Allied Armies such a military ascendancy as would make a renewal of hostilities by Germany impossible. The provisions may be summarized as follows:

1. Military operations by land and in the air to cease 6 hours after signature of the armistice.

2. Evacuation of Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, and Luxemburg, with occupation by Allied forces, within 14 days.

3. Repatriation within 15 days of all inhabitants of above countries, including hostages and persons under trial or convicted.

4. Surrender in good condition of 2,500 heavy guns, 2,500 field guns, 25,000 machine guns, 3,000 *minenwerfer*, 1,700 airplanes (fighters and bombers).

5. German evacuation and Allied occupation and administration of German territory on the left bank of the Rhine, the Allies to hold the principal crossings of the Rhine (Mainz, Coblenz, and Cologne) with bridgeheads radiating 30 kilometers (18.6 miles) eastward therefrom. A neutral zone 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) wide to be left east of the Rhine and the bridgeheads. These rearrangements to be completed within 31 days after the conclusion of the armistice.

6. The inhabitants in the evacuated area to remain unmolested. There shall be no destruction of factories, food, or unremoved military material.

7. There shall be no destruction of roads, telegraphs, telephones, etc., nor removal of personnel employed on the same. Five thousand locomotives, 150,000 railroad cars, and 5,000 motor trucks to be surrendered. The railways of Alsace-Lorraine to be handed over with their pre-war personnel and material. Stocks of coal, etc., and signals and repair shops to be abandoned. Barges taken from the Allies are to be restored.

8. All destructive agencies (mines, poisoned wells, etc.) shall be revealed within 48 hours, under penalty of reprisals.

9. The Allies may make requisitions in the occupied regions. The upkeep of the troops of occupation in the Rhineland (except Alsace-Lorraine) shall be charged to the German Government.

10. Unconditional and immediate repatriation of all Allied prisoners, without reciprocity; previous conventions on this subject are annulled, except for Germans interned in Holland and Switzerland.

11. German sick and wounded, who cannot be removed, will be cared for by Germans left for that purpose, with required medical material.

12. German troops are to withdraw at once from Austria-Hungary, Roumania, and Turkey; and from Russia when the Allies decide that the Russian situation permits.

13. German instructors, prisoners, civilian and military agents in Russia, to be immediately recalled.

14. No further supplies for Germany to be seized or requisitioned in Russia or Roumania.

15. The treaties of Bucharest and Brest-Litovsk, and supplementary treaties, to be renounced.

16. Freedom of access to Russia granted to the Allies, via Danzig and the Vistula, to carry supplies and to maintain order.

17. Evacuation by all German forces operating in East Africa within a period to be fixed.

18. Repatriation, without reciprocity, of all interned Allied civilians within one month.

19. Reparation for damage done. No public securities which may serve as a pledge for reparation are to be removed. The cash deposit in the National Bank of Belgium to be immediately restored; also all documents, species, bonds, paper money, etc., in the invaded countries. The gold yielded to Germany by Russia and Roumania, to be delivered in trust to the Allies.

20. Immediate cessation of naval operations; information as to location and movements of German ships to be given. Allied shipping may use territorial waters, without violating neutrality.

21. Release of all Allied mercantile and naval prisoners, without reciprocity.

22. Surrender of all submarines, including submarine cruisers and mine-laying submarines, with complete armament and equipment.

23. The following German warships to be interned in neutral or Allied ports, under the supervision of the Allies and of the United States: 6 battle cruisers, 10 battleships, 8 light cruisers, 50 destroyers. All other surface warships to be concentrated in German naval bases designated by the Allies and the United States and completely disarmed.

24. The Allies and the United States to have the right to sweep up all mine fields laid by Germany outside of territorial waters, Germany indicating their positions.

25. Freedom of access to and from the Baltic given the associated powers. To secure this, German forts and defenses at the entrance may be occupied by the Allies and the United States, and mines removed even in German territorial waters.

26. Existing blockade conditions set up by the associated powers to remain unchanged, and all German merchant ships found at sea to remain liable to capture. But the Allies and the United States "should give consideration to the provisioning of Germany during the armistice, to the extent recognized as necessary."

27. All naval aircraft to be concentrated and immobilized in specified German bases.

28. All port and river navigation material, all merchant ships, tugs, lighters, all naval aeronautic apparatus, material, and supplies, and all arms, apparatus, and supplies of every kind, in Belgian ports and coasts, to be abandoned *in situ*.

29. Russian Black Sea ports to be evacuated, with surrender of Russian war vessels seized by Germany, and release of neutral vessels German materials there to be abandoned as in article 28.

30. Allied and associated merchant vessels in German hands to be restored, without reciprocity.

31. No destruction of ships or material to be permitted.

32. Germany to notify the neutral governments, particularly Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, of the cancellation of all German restrictions on their trade with the Allied and associated countries.

33. No transfer of German shipping to neutral flags after the signing of the armistice.

34. The duration of the armistice to be 30 days, with option to extend. In order to assure the execution of this convention the principle of a permanent international armistice commission is admitted, to act under the authority of the Allied military and naval commanders in chief.

Certain points in the above armistice have an obvious bearing upon the final peace terms; of these the most important are:

1. The evacuation of all territory that was not German on August 1, 1914.

2. The evacuation and implied restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine.

3. The renunciation of the treaties of Bucharest and of Brest-Litovsk, together with the agreements supplementary to those treaties. (See Appendix II.)

4. Transfer to the Allies, to be held in trust for Russia and Rou-

mania, of the gold received by Germany in accordance with these treaties.

5. Restitution of the cash deposit in the national bank of Belgium and of all "documents, specie, stocks, shares, paper money, touching public or private interests in the invaded countries."

6. Repatriation without reciprocity of all deported or interned civilians, including hostages and persons under trial or convicted, belonging to the Allied or associated powers.

7. Reparation for damages done.

No Peace of Greed or Vengeance.—Internal revolution in Germany accompanied the signing of the armistice, with abdication of the German Emperor and practically all hereditary rulers, and the setting up of a socialist republic. Germany was not merely defeated, but crushed. The intention of the Allied Governments, nevertheless, to adhere to the principles of a just peace as advocated by President Wilson was announced in an address delivered by Premier Lloyd George on November 11, the day on which the armistice was signed:

"They [the conditions of peace] must lead to a settlement which will be fundamentally just. No settlement that contravenes the principles of eternal justice will be a permanent one. The peace of 1871 imposed by Germany on France outraged all the principles of justice and fair play. Let us be warned by that example.

"We must not allow any sense of revenge, any spirit of greed, any grasping desire, to override the fundamental principles of righteousness. Vigorous attempts will be made to hector and bully the Government in an endeavor to make them depart from the strict principles of right, and to satisfy some base, sordid, squalid idea of vengeance and of avarice. We must relentlessly set our faces against that. . . .

"A large number of small nations have been reborn in Europe, and these will require a League of Nations to protect them against the covetousness of ambitious and grasping neighbors. In my judgment a League of Nations is absolutely essential to permanent peace. We shall go to the peace conference to guarantee that a League of Nations is a reality." (See Appendix V.)

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I.—THE “VITAL INTERESTS” OF GERMANY

A petition was presented to the Chancellor, May 20, 1915, from six of the great industrial and agricultural associations which represent powerful and widely spread interests in Germany. They urged that Belgium should be subject to Germany in “military and tariff matters, as well as in currency, banking, and post.” Northern France as far as the river Somme should also be annexed for “our future position at sea,” and the industrial establishments in the annexed territories be transferred to German hands. From Russia part of the Baltic Provinces and the territories to the south should be taken. The necessity of new agricultural territory, of new mining and industrial districts, especially of the coal and iron of Belgium and northern France, were emphasized.

Nearly all exponents of public opinion in Germany, save the Social Democrats, advocated large additions to the German Empire as a result of the war. Most wished parts of northern France, where there is coal and iron, all of Belgium, and the conquered parts of Russia, which include rich agricultural territory and the greatest manufacturing region. There is another school, however—a comparatively small group—who feared that Germany would make lasting enemies by such a peace, and who hoped that Germany’s gains would be in a colonial empire. They proposed that the Congo be taken from Belgium, Morocco from France, and various islands from Portugal. Both those who wished territories from Germany’s neighbors and those who wished colonies agreed on the importance of the route to the southeast. Germany must control the lands as far as the Persian Gulf and, if possible, Persia. “Berlin to Bombay” was the dream of one Pan-German.

Terms were set forth in a petition adopted on June 20, 1915, and signed by 1,341 important men in Germany, including 352 professors, 158 educators and clergymen, 145 high officials, mayors and municipal officials, 148 judges and lawyers, 252 painters, writers, and publishers. It advocated the annexation of the whole northern part of France, from Belfort to the coast of the English Channel, and the transfer of the business undertakings and estates to German ownership. Belgium was to be held and the inhabitants allowed no political influence in the Empire. The occupied part of Russia was to be retained and the land turned over to Germany. Egypt was to be taken from England. As to indemnities, “we ought not to hesitate to impose upon France as much as possible.”

APPENDIX II.—TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK

The terms which Germany finally presented at Brest-Litovsk were forced upon Russia by the advance of the German armies into Russian territory. Lenine and Trotzky signed, March 3, 1918, the treaty held out to them at the point of the sword, which is known as the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The main provisions of the treaty were the following: (1) The surrender by Russia of the provinces of Courland, Poland, Lithuania, Livonia, and Esthonia. (2) The

surrender by Russia to Turkey of Batum, Kars, and certain other districts in Transcaucasia. (3) Russia to make peace with Finland and Ukraine, thus recognizing their independence.

Three agreements supplementary to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk were entered into between Russia and Germany about August 9, 1918. These agreements provided for the exchange of ratifications before September 6, 1918, in Berlin; they were published, September 7, 1918, in the *Deutscher Reichsanzeiger*, and fill three entire pages of that paper.—I. The first of these agreements provides for evacuation of territory, the chief points being the following: (1) Germany will evacuate Esthonia and Livonia after border commissions have established the exact boundaries of these two states; will evacuate territory east of the Beresina river in proportion to the payment of the indemnity of 6,000,000,000 marks fixed in the financial agreement (see second agreement); will evacuate territory west of the Beresina according to agreements to be negotiated. (2) Germany will not aid in the establishment of separate states and nations of Russia, except as stated below. (3) Russia will use all means to remove the Entente forces in northern Russia, and Germany will guarantee that during such operations the Finns will not attack Russian territory. (4) Russia renounces all claims and all right of interference in Esthonia and Livonia; agrees to the establishment of free trade to and from Russia through Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Lithuania; and agrees that freight rates shall be as low as possible. (5) After the ratification of the treaty between Russia and Ukrainia, Germany will evacuate Russian Black Sea territory, except Caucasia; Germany will recognize Georgia as an independent nation; and will encourage the production of crude oil in Baku, one-fourth of which, or at least a definite quantity, to go to Germany. (6) Russian warships to remain in German hands till the final peace.—II. The second agreement relates to finance, the principal points being as follows: (1) Russia will pay to Germany 6,000,000,000 marks, and will renounce all counter demands including claims for property confiscated by German troops. (2) One and one-half billions of this indemnity is to be paid in bank notes and in gold, in installments due September 10, September 30, October 31, November 30, and December 31, 1918; one billion will be paid in supplies to be shipped in seven installments, beginning November 15, 1918, and ending March 31, 1920; two and one-half billions will be paid before December 21, 1918, by the issuance of bonds at 6 per cent from January 1, 1919, floated by the Russian Government in Germany and secured by Russian state revenues; this security to be determined by special agreements and in such a way that the estimated annual income shall exceed the annual interest and liquidation of the loan by at least 20 per cent; the remaining one billion will be paid according to agreements later negotiated. (3) Each Government will regard bank deposits in its territory as lawful deposits of citizens of the other Government if they have been placed in the name of such a citizen, otherwise it must be proved that the deposits belong to such citizens.—III. The third agreement relates to certain aspects of civil law in respect to exchanges, extension of time for payment of international checks, the appointment of commissions for settling disputes between citizens of the two countries, etc.

Maxim Gorky calculated that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk robbed the Russian Empire of 4 per cent of its total area, 26 per cent of its population, 27 per cent of agricultural land normally cultivated, 37 per cent of its food-stuffs production, 26 per cent of its railways, 33 per cent of manufacturing industries, 75 per cent of its coal, and 73 per cent of its iron. This was the kind of a treaty which Germany had in mind when she declared to the world, in order to induce the Allies to enter into peace negotiations, that "forceful annexation was not intended by the Central Powers."

APPENDIX III.—THE KAISER'S VIEWS

Between December 22, 1917, and March 20, 1918, the Kaiser several times revealed his idea of the way peace had come and must come:

"The year 1917 with its great battles has proved that the German people has in the Lord of Creation above an unconditional and avowed ally on whom it can absolutely rely. . . . If the enemy does not want peace, then we must bring peace to the world by battering in with the iron fist and shining sword the doors of those who will not have peace."—(Address to German Second Army on the French front, December 22, 1917.)

"We desire to live in friendship with neighboring peoples, but the victory of German arms must first be recognized. Our troops under the great Hindenburg will continue to win it. Then peace will come."—(On conclusion of peace with Ukrainia, February 11, 1918.)

"The German sword wielded by great army leaders has brought peace with Russia. With deep gratitude to God, who has been with us, I am filled with proud joy at the deeds of my army and the tenacious perseverance of my people. It is of especial satisfaction to me that German blood and German *Kultur* have been saved. Accept my warmest thanks for your faithful and strong coöperation in the great work."—(Telegram to Count von Hertling, March 4, 1918.)

"The prize of victory must not and will not fail us. No soft peace, but one corresponding with Germany's interests."—(To Schleswig-Holstein Provincial Council, March 20, 1918.)

APPENDIX IV.—PEACE TERMS OF OTHER COUNTRIES

FRANCE.—The French Government has not defined its peace terms so often or so fully as either England or the United States. It has, however, defined them with equal clearness. It has consistently taken the ground that France was invaded without cause, and that there can be no peace without the complete evacuation of French territory and the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine. The Government, officially or semi-officially, has strongly approved of President Wilson's statements of peace terms. Besides, the Chamber of Deputies, June 5, 1917, adopted a resolution of which the substance was as follows: "The Chamber of Deputies . . . declares that it expects from the war imposed upon Europe by the aggression of imperialist Germany the return of

Alsace-Lorraine to the mother country, together with liberation of invaded territories and just reparation for damage. Far removed from all thoughts of conquest . . . it expects that the efforts of the armies of her Republic and her allies will secure, once Prussian militarism is destroyed, durable guarantees for peace, and independence for peoples, great and small, in a League of Nations such as has already been foreshadowed."

ITALY.—June 20, 1917, Baron Sonnino, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in defining Italy's peace terms said: "No peace will be agreeable to us which does not assure the restoration of . . . Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro. The restoration of the independence of Poland is also an essential clause of our peace terms. The rights of nationality must be protected. It is in moments of danger that the bonds between nations become stronger." Since this date the secret treaty negotiated at the time Italy entered the war, promising territorial gains to Italy, has been repudiated; and in April, 1918, the representatives of the Austrian Slavs and of the Italians, at a congress held at Rome, agreed to work together to "achieve the unity and independence of the Jugo-Slav nation and the completion of Italian nationality."

SERBIA.—Before a meeting of the Serbian parliament held in Corfu on March 31, 1918, the Serbian Prime Minister, Mr. Nicholas Pasitch, voiced war aims similar to those expressed by President Wilson. He said in part: "We ask nothing that does not belong to us by right. We demand the abolition of the slavery of peoples as it was abolished for individuals. We demand equality for all the nations, large and small, the fraternity and equality of all the nationalities and the foundation of a free state of all the united Jugo-Slavs, the retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and the complete reestablishment of an independent Belgium; the reestablishment of the kingdom of all the Czechs and also of all the Poles; the union of the Italians with Italy, of the Roumanians with Roumania, of the Greeks with Greece: all this constituting the greatest and most solid guarantee for a just and durable international peace." July 26 it was reported that a Serbian national war-aims committee, recently organized in London, included among Serbian—Jugo-Slav war aims the following: "The independence and union of the Jugo-Slavs; the Balkans for the Balkan peoples; reparation to the devastated countries inhabited by Jugo-Slavs; economic and intellectual intercourse with the Allied countries, as they would mean the best support and defense for the future of the nation and recovery from the present catastrophe."

BULGARIA.—Mr. Radoslavoff, the Bulgarian Prime Minister, in 1917 defined Bulgaria's war aims and peace terms as follows:

"We want Macedonia—that is, we don't want it, because we already have it. Our troops are in Macedonia and we will never get out of it. At all costs we must be neighbors with Austria-Hungary. Our friendship has grown during the war and has become an alliance as solid as a rock. Now we can clasp hands across the Morava valley. This neighborhood was very necessary for us. Some day we should have to have it. I ask myself how much have the Austro-Bulgar relations suffered by the unfortunate fact that Serbia has come in between us. The way which leads from Bulgaria to Europe is

now open. This passage has been secured without the violation of the principle of nationality which the Allies have so insistently put forward [i.e. Serbian land is Bulgarian.] We have been accused by the Allies of conscripting from the conquered countries. The conquered lands are Bulgarian. If we have shed our blood to conquer them it is not in order to leave them alone."

The official Bulgarian journal in commenting on this says: "Even if the latter [Bulgaria] had no right over the valley of the Morava, the need of having a free line of communication with the Central Powers would be for her a sufficient reason to claim its possession."

On May 19, 1916, the *Nazodni Prava*, speaking of the peace negotiations says: "Especially on the question of Serbia, our veritable enemy, our diplomats must be instructed to be above all severe and inexorable. They must put aside all sentimentalism; every humanitarian consideration, and every softness of heart. The existence of a Serb state, under whatsoever form that may be, is equivalent to a prolongation of troubles in the Balkans. This state which since its independence has not ceased to be a nest of disorder and dissensions must be exterminated from the face of the earth. . . . That is why it is necessary for our diplomats to apply the maxim of Bismarck: No generosity until after the conclusion of peace."—(Quotations from the *Review of Reviews*, August, 1918.)

The terms of the Bulgarian armistice of September 29, 1918, are a cheering contrast to this: Bulgaria agreed to evacuate all territory occupied by her in Greece and Serbia, to demobilize her army, and to store all military material under Allied control. All means of transport were to be surrendered to the Allies, including all boats and the control of navigation on the Danube. The Allies were also conceded free passage through Bulgaria for the development of military operations, with the right to occupy all important strategic points.

APPENDIX V.—A LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The ideal of European unity is an old one, but its development into the present proposals for a world-wide League of Nations is essentially modern. The older plans serve more as evidence of the beginnings of cosmopolitanism, or have suggestions of imperial ambitions or desires to interfere in the internal affairs of certain nations, not for the good of the world order of the people most concerned, but rather for the good of the interfering powers, as in the case of the so-called Holy Alliance. The recent movement toward a better international order has had a sounder basis, in the best interests of all peoples; and it has come forward logically in the nineteenth century, side by side with the development of nationality. This internationalism presupposes the continuance of national states, and arises out of their contacts and common interests. It is the more evidently needed as the number of nations, and especially of struggling nations, increases. Strong nations can no longer exist in isolation, much less weak ones.

The complete breaking down of national isolation, so that every nation is now part of the whole world order, is due to a new economic and social order, with which our political organization has not kept pace. The chief agencies

in drawing nations together are railroads, steamships, telegraph lines, and other means of communication, and those aspects of industry and commerce which make for interdependence. The last sixty years has seen an increasing multiplication of agencies for international expression and action. They have acted in the main intermittently and in separate fields, but the net result has been to create a marked tendency towards internationalism of thought and action. Since the holding of the first International Sanitary Conference in 1850, gatherings or congresses have been held, with varying frequency, to deal with such matters as statistics, sugar duties, fisheries, weights and measures, monetary standards, international posts and telegraphs, the navigation of rivers, submarine cables, private international law, the protection of copyrights, suppression of the liquor traffic in Africa, the abolition of traffic in slaves, promotion of the interests of the working classes, the advancement of international arbitration, promotion of woman suffrage, and various topics of a purely scientific, literary, or historical interest. A list which makes no pretence to completeness shows 116 such official international conferences, held under government sanction or initiative, between the years 1850 and 1907, while the list of unofficial congresses must be very much greater. It is said that in the year 1907 alone there were over 160 such gatherings, official and unofficial.

A number of these gatherings have resulted in permanently organized international bureaus, with administrative and quasi-legislative powers. Examples of these are the International Postal Union, organized in 1874; the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property (patents, trademarks, etc.), organized in 1883; the European Union of Railway Freight Transportation, organized in 1890, etc. At the same time there came to be an increased reliance for the preservation of peace between Governments on the so-called "Concert of Europe"—that is to say, the attempt to settle international questions by means of concerted action of the five or six great powers, acting not so much through public treaties as through joint understandings embodied in diplomatic notes and other communications. At the close of the nineteenth century, when it was clear that the Concert of Europe was giving way to two rival alliances, the ideal of a definite federation of Europe, such as earlier had been advanced, again revived. Societies, of which the League to Enforce Peace, the American Association for International Conciliation, and the World Peace Foundation are examples, were formed and were active in the promotion of schemes for preventing war. The Czar's proposal of disarmament in 1899, the Hague Conferences, and the establishment of the Hague Tribunal, are all indications of the widespread interest in the subject.

Nevertheless, at the outbreak of the present war the idea of a League of Nations was regarded, probably by the great majority, as a visionary scheme. The war, however, has brought about a profound revolution in the thought of the world in respect to the whole question of war and the means of preventing it; and within four years the project of a League of Nations has been brought within the realm of practical politics. President Wilson has repeatedly urged the necessity of such a league as the only means of preventing the repetition of the present conflict. From the first he has made this idea the central fea-

ture of his international policy. Party leaders and responsible statesmen in most European countries have expressed themselves as being favorable to some kind of international organization for the preservation of peace. The question is so far a part of practical politics that it has been discussed in the British House of Commons (August 1, 1918), and the British, French and Swiss Governments have appointed commissions to investigate and report on the general question of international reconstruction. The following quotations from men in different countries will indicate something of the state of opinion on this subject:

"A general association of nations must be formed, under specific covenants, for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."—(President Wilson, January 8, 1918.)

"The constitution of that League of Nations and the clear definition of its objects must be a part, in a sense the most essential part, of the peace settlement itself. It cannot be formed now. If formed now it would be merely a new alliance confined to the nations associated against a common enemy. It is not likely that it could be formed after the settlement. It is necessary to guarantee the peace; and the peace cannot be guaranteed as an afterthought." Some necessary conditions were stated by the President as follows: "No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all. There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations. . . . And more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the League, and no employment of any form of boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations itself, as a means of discipline and control. . . . All international agreements and treaties of every kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world."—(President Wilson, September 27, 1918.)

"It is a moral victory the world should win. I think I do not mistake the current of public sentiment throughout our entire country, in saying that our people will favor an international agreement by which the peace brought about through such blood and suffering and destruction and enormous sacrifices shall be preserved by the joint power of the world. Whether the terms of the League to Enforce Peace as they are will be taken as a basis for agreement, or a modified form, something of the kind must be attempted."—(Ex-President W. H. Taft, September 26, 1917.)

"A great attempt must be made to establish by some international organization an alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes."—(Lloyd George, British Prime Minister, January 5, 1918.)

"A large number of small nations have been reborn in Europe, and these will require a League of Nations to protect them against the covetousness of ambitious and grasping neighbors. In my judgment a League of Nations is absolutely essential to permanent peace. We shall go to the peace conference

to guarantee that a League of Nations is a reality.”—(Lloyd George, November 11, 1918.)

“During the first month or six weeks of the war I said, quoting a phrase of Mr. Gladstone’s, that the ‘enthronment of the idea of public right’ was the best definition we could have of the ends of our war policy. And that idea, I added, could only be realized by a ‘real international partnership, based on the recognition of equal rights, and established and enforced by a common will.’ I venture to recall those words, lest it should be supposed that what we now speak of as the League of Nations was a mere afterthought. But there can be no question that President Wilson has done more than any statesman of the Entente to concentrate the minds, not only of his own people and of the Allies, but of neutral nations, and I will add, so far as they are allowed to hear and know the truth, of the enemy peoples themselves, upon this as our dominating and world-wide aim. It is this which, apart from, and in addition to, the special claims and special interests of this or that nationality, justifies the sacrifice which the great democracies are making of their blood and their treasure, of the best resources of their manhood, of the brightest promise of their youth.”—(Herbert H. Asquith, leader of the Liberal Party in Great Britain, July 4, 1918.)

“We must try to get some alliance, or confederation, or conference, to which these states shall belong, and no state in which shall be at liberty to go to war without reference to arbitration, or to a conference of the League, in the first place. Then if a state breaks the contract it will become *ipso facto* at war with the other states of the League, and they will support each other, without any need for an international police, in punishing or repairing the breach of the contract. Some of them may do it by economic pressure. This may apply perhaps to the smaller states. The larger and more powerful states may do it by the direct use of naval and military force. In this way we may not indeed abolish war, but we can render it a good deal more difficult in the future.”—(Lord Curzon, June 26, 1918.)

“I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately. . . . The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite *rapprochement* between the powers than has been possible hitherto.”—(Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, July 30, 1914.)

“I sincerely desire to see a League of Nations formed and made effective to secure the future peace of the world after this war is over. I regard this as the best if not the only prospect of preserving treaties and of saving the world from aggressive wars in years to come.”—(Sir Edward, Viscount Grey, November 24, 1916.)

"The establishment and maintenance of a League of Nations such as President Wilson has advocated is more important and essential to secure peace than any of the actual terms of peace that may conclude the war. It will transeem them all. The best of them will be worth little unless the future relations of states are to be on a basis that will prevent a recurrence of militarism in a state."—(Sir Edward, Viscount Grey, in June, 1918.)

"The creation of some international alliance embracing all the peace-loving nations could hardly succeed without the cooperation of the greatest of neutral nations [the United States, at that time still a neutral]. With the cooperation, difficult as the effort to construct such a scheme will be, there is at least a real hope of success. Largely in vain will this war have been fought and all these sufferings endured if the peoples of the world are to fall back into a state of permanent alarm, suspicion, and hostility, each weighed down by the frightful burden of armaments."—(Lord Bryce, October 3, 1916.)

"The Chamber of Deputies, the direct expression of the sovereignty of the French people, expects that the efforts of the armies of the Republic and her allies will secure, once Prussian militarism is destroyed, durable guarantees of peace and independence for peoples great and small, in a League of Nations such as has already been foreshadowed."—(Resolution of French Chamber of Deputies June 6, 1917, approved by Senate.)

"The union of all the living forces of the country is an essential condition of success. It is that which will lead us to our goal—a peace by victory,—a solid lasting peace, guaranteed against any return of violence by appropriate international measures."—(A. Briand, speaking while Premier of France.)

"Now that the heads of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain have pronounced in its favor, and the principle has been accepted from the tribune of the French Chamber by Premier Ribot, no one would venture to call the League of Nations a Utopia."—(M. Albert Thomas, former French Minister of Munitions, November, 1918.)

"In a general way they desire to declare their respect for the lofty sentiments inspiring the American note, and their wholehearted agreement with the proposal to create a League of Nations which shall assure peace and justice throughout the world."—(Allied note in reply to President Wilson, January 10, 1917.)

"All states must be pressed to join a League of Nations for the prevention of wars. This involves the complete democratization of all countries. The rules on which the league shall be founded must be included in the treaty of peace. President Wilson's four general principles of February 11, 1918, are accepted."—(Memorandum of war aims adopted by the Inter-Allied Labor and Socialist Conference, in London, February 23, 1918.)